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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TROY 0. NANCE, and 
THOMAS B. HANLEY, 
Plain tiffs-Respondents 
vs. 
SHEET METAL WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 




STATEMENT OF 1THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action f.or reinstatement to membership in 
defendant labor union and for actual and punitive dam-
ages for alleged wrongful expulsion of Plaintiffs from 
union membership. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case has previously ibeen appealed to the Supreme 
Court where a judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, was re-
versed. The trial court thereafter refused to give effect 
to the reversal and instead entered an Amended Judgment 
and Decree that partially affirmed its original judgment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Amended Judgment 
and Decree and entry of judgment in its favor in accord-
ance with the prior decision upon appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FAC'TS 
This is not an appeal on the merits since the case on 
the merits has already been appealed, submitted and de-
cided. The present appeal raises the narrow issue whether 
the trial court, after the case had been heard on appeal 
and reversed, entered a judgment consistent with the de-
cision of this court. As we shall point out, it clearly did not. 
'The appellate deoision in the case (which was then 
assigned as No. 9111) was handed down on September 21, 
1961, at which time the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs'1 
was reversed. (R. 7-a). The trial court has refused to give 
effect to the reversal of its prior decision, however, and, 
in an order· dated February 5, 1962, entitled Amended 
Judgment and Decree (R. 12-a to 14-a.), it reinstated part 
of the judgment which had been reversed. The Supreme 
Court reversal has thus been recast by the trial court as a 
partial affirmance. 
The Plaintiffs in Octoiber of 1961, in their Petition 
for Rehearing, asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its 
September 21, 1961, decision and grant them the same type 
of partial affirmance that the trial court entered on Febru-
ary 5, 1962. Their Petition for Rehearing after being con-
sidered by the Court was denied on December 6, 1961. The 
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Court thereafter issued its remittitur plainly direeting that 
the judgment below was reversed. The remittitur was 
worded as follows : 
"This cause having been heretofore argued and 
submitted and the Court being sufficiently advised in 
the premises, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the Judgment of the District Court herein ibe, and 
the same is, reversed. Costs before the jury trial to 
respondents, and those· thereafter to appellant.'' 
(R. 6-a). 
The first intimation that the trial court did not intend 
to carry out the decision of the Supreme Court was given 
on January 9, 1962, when counsel for Defendant2 appeared 
before Judge Hoyt in Nephi for a hearing on the motions 
of both parties to have costs taxed. Counsel for Plaintiffs 
did not attend the hearing, although they had been duly 
notified thereof. At this hearing the respective costs bills 
were discussed, but, in addition, Judge Hoyt made· the 
following observations: 
''THE COURT : Do you contend that the Supreme 
Court ruled upon the holding of the trial court, that 
the expulsion was wrongful, or did they avoid ruling 
on that! 
"MR. SANDACK: Well, I think all you can read 
into the Supreme Court's decision is what they have 
said in the remittitur which is 'that it is ordered, ad-
judged and decreed that the judgment of the District 
Court herein be, and the same· is, reversed.' 
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"Now, the judgment :filed by your Honor included 
a :finding, conclusion, and decree that the· expulsion was 
illegal. 'The Supreme Court has reversed that finding 
and judgment. 
* * * * 
"THE COURT: . I do not read anything in 
their opinion in which they held that on the facts that 
the trial court erred in holding expulsion was wrong-
ful." (R. 25-a to 28-a). 
A later intimation that the decision of the Supreme 
Court would not he followed and that the trial court would 
not acknowledge the appellate decision as a reversal of 
the prior judgment was given on January 16, 1962. At that 
time Judge Hoyt in an ''Order on Motions for Taxing Costs 
and for Discharge of Bonds"2 taxed costs against the re-
spective parties but refused to enter a judgment for costs. 
In that Order he said: 
''5. The court further concludes that since no judg-
ment has been entered or submitted to this court for 
carrying into effect the decision of the Supreme Court 
it is premature to enter a judgment for costs at this 
time, and that no execution should issue until final 
judgment is entered. 
* * * * 
"7. Counsel for either party may submit conclusions 
of law and form of final judgment in conformity with 
the opinion and mandate of the Supreme Court." 
(Appendix, p. 5). 
· Counsel for Defendant thereafter submitted a memor-
andum to Judge Hoyt in which they pointed out that the 
remittitur of the Supreme Court was itself a self-executing 
3 This do,cument was through inadvertence not designated as part 
of the record on the appeal. It is reproduced in full in the appendix 
following the brief, for the convenience of the court. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
final order and that no further order was necessary or 
proper, except, of course, a judgment for costs. At the same 
time, they tendered to the court a form of "Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment,"4 (R. 9-a to 11-a) inasmuch a.s Judge 
Hoyt virtually required them to do so. 
The pertinent portions of the Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment proposed by Defendant, read as follows: 
"Now, therefore, the court makes the following 
conclusions of law: 
'' 1. That the judgment of the trial court in the 
cause, above quoted, has been reversed in entirety by 
the Supreme Court of Utah. 
"2. That pursuant to the remittitur of the 
Supreme Court of Utah this court is without power to 
do other than enter a judgment of reversal of the judg-
ment heretofore entered by this court and to tax costs 
and enter a judgment therefor. 
"3. That judgment should be entered for the de-
fendant in the amount of the difference between the 
costs taxed against the plaintiff and the costs taxed 
against the defendants. 
''WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUD,GED 
AND DECREED 
"1. 'That the judgment in this cause heretofore 
entered by the court on the 29th day of June, 1959, 
should be, and hereby is, reversed in entirety. 
'' 2. That Defendant Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Association be, and it is hereby, given judg-
ment against the plaintiffs, in the sum of $1,718.39, for 
court costs.'' 
• The text of Defendant- Appellant's proposed Conclusions of Law 
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No draft of Amended Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
was proposed or submitted by counsel for Plaintiffs. 
Judge Hoyt took final action on Fehruary 5, 1962. On 
that date he filed his Amended Conclusions of Law5 and 
Amended Judgment and Decree6 (R. 12-a to 14-a), in which 
he reinstated a portion of the original judgment of June 
29, 1959. 
The ".Amended Judgment and Decree" provides in 
part: 
"This court having duly considered the opinion' 
and decision of the Supreme Court, and pursuant to 
said decision, having made and caused to he entered 
herein its Amended Conclusions of Law, now based 
upon Findings of Faet heretofore made and entered 
herein and upon said Amended Conclusions of La:w 
and the· decision and opinion of the Supreme Court, 
it is now 
''ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as 
follows, to-wit : 
"1. That the purported expulsion of the petitioner 
and intervenor from membership in the respondent 
association was and is wrongful, malicious, null and 
void as to each of said parties. 
* * * * 
"5. That this judgment shall not constitute any 
adjudication of the truth or falsity of the charges pre-
ferred against the petitioner or intervenor and shall 
5 The Amended Conclusions of Law was also inadvertently omitted 
in our designation of the record and therefore is reproduced in full 
in the ~ppendix. 
e The complete text of the Amended Judgment and Decree is repro• 
duced in the appendix. 
6 
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not operate as a. bar to trial of the charges preferred 
against the petitioner and intervenor before a union 
tribunal provided such trial is conducted in accordance 
with the respondent's constitution and the require-
ments of law relating to due notice and specific~ation of 
charges, reasonable time and opportunity to prepare 
for trial, trial before a disinterested and impartial tri-
bunal, and reasonable opportunity to present evidence· 
and to confront and cross-examine opposing wit-
nesses.'' 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Amended 
Judgment and Decree insofar as it grants affirmative relief 
to the Plaintiffs, is not only inconsistent with, but squarely 
in opposition to, the decision of the Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT BELOW 
ERRED IN ENTERING THE AMENDED 
JUDGMENT IN THAT THE REMITTITUR OF 
THE SUPREME COURT WAS A SELF-EXE-
CUTING ORDER REVERSING THE ORIG-
INAL JUDGMENT BELOW, AND NO FUR-
THER ORDER TO JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS NECESSARY OR 
PROPER. 
The Statement of Facts hereinabove establishes the 
err-or of the trial court so convincingly that the argument 
on the law can be made in reasonably short form. 
The original judgment of the trial court, entered on 
June 29, 1959, was predicated upon an adjudication that 
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the expulsions of Plaintiffs from membership in Defendant 
laibor union were wrongful, null, void, and malicious. This 
was not a mere declaration in the abstract; it was the basic 
adjudication in the case, from which, or upon the basis of 
which, the trial court granted injunctive relief and amerced 
the Defendant with punitive damages and an award of fees 
to opposing counsel. When the case was reversed on appeal, 
the trial court's former judgment was vacated and set 
aside. 
The trial court, however, refused to acknowledge the 
consequences of a reversal and insisted upon granting 
Plaintiffs a judgment upon the merits, specifically a judg-
ment as to the validity of the union expulsion proceedings. 
It became apparent after several attempts at persuasion 
that further efforts o~ the part of Defendant to convince 
Judge Hoyt that such action was erroneous would he futile, 
even though the law on the subject is well settled. 
The effect of a reversal of a judgment by an appellate 
court is described in 3 American Jurisprudence 690 as fol-
lows: 
''To reverse is to vacate· or set aside, but it does 
not include any other affirmative action unless speci-
fically directed iby the appellate court.'' 
In Co~wdery v. London db San Francisco Bank, 139 Cal. 298, 
303-304, 73 Pac. 196 (1903), the California Supreme Court 
said: 
''The legal effect of the order of the Supreme 
Court was to reverse and vacate judgment, and not 
merely to modify it. Upon a decision of the Supreme 
Court that there was material error in the action of 
the court below, that court may direct the character of 
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the subsequent proceedings in the lower court, and its 
mandate will vary according to its views as to the 
proper course- to be pursued. . . . To reverse is, 'to 
overthrow; set aside ; make- void; annul; repeal; re-
voke; as to reverse a judgment, sentence, or decree' 
(Century Dictionary), or 'to change to the contrary, 
or to a former condition' (Standard Dictionary) .... 
The distinction between a reversal of a judgment and 
an affirmance with a modification is too marked and 
radical to justify us in disregarding it.'' 
This matter has also been considered by the Supreme 
Court of Utah, in Utah Copper C1o. v. District Court of 
Third Judicial District, 91 Utah 377, 64 P. 2d 241, 250 
(1937), where this court held: 
"The lower court upon remand of a case from a 
higher court, must obey the mandate or remittitur and 
render judgment in conformity thereto and has no 
authority to enter any judgment not in conformity with 
the order. Whatever comes before and is decided and 
disposed of iby the reviewing court is considered as fin-
ally settled, and the inferior court to which a mandate 
issues is bound by the decree as the law of the case and 
must carry it into execution according to the mandate-, 
and after the reviewing court has determined the- case 
before it and remanded it to the lower court, the latter 
is without power to modify, alter, amend, set aside or 
in any manner disturb or depart from the judgment of 
the reviewing court, that the judgment of the higher 
court is not reviewable in any way by the court below 
and the lower court cannot vary or examine the decree 
of the· higher court for any other purpose than execu-
tion, or give any other or further relief or review it 
even for apparent error upon any matter decided on 
appeal, or meddle with it further than to settle so much 
as has been remanded." 
9 
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The most recent case in point in Utah is Phebus v. Dunr 
ford, 114 Utah 292, 198 P. 2d 973 (1948). In P,he1bus, a trial 
court judgment had been reversed in the Supreme Court 
of Utah and subsequently the trial court, upon motion, set 
aside its former judgment as to some, but not all, of the 
original defendants. The Defendant against whom the 
judgment was not set aside brought a writ of mandate in 
the Supreme Oourt to require the trial court to set its entire 
decision aside. The court there said : 
'' [2] The lower court should not have entertained 
the motion to set aside the former decision. The decis-
ion of this court when filed in the lower court automati-
ca.l.ly set the low'er court's decision aside withou.t fur-
ther action by that court. Our decision did not direct 
the lower court to take action to vacate its former de-
cision. It acted directly upon the lower court's decision 
and effectually vacated and set aside that decision. Our 
decision waiS without limitation as to how mruch of the 
lower court's decision was set aside. It set it all aside. 
After the filing of the remittitur from this court in the 
lower court, there was nothing upon which such a mo-
tion could properly have been predicated.'' (Emphasis 
ours.) 
These Utah cases not only state the current law of 
Utah on the issue but also are in accord with general author-
ity on the effect of the reversal of a judgment by an appel-
late court. Under the Utah rule, the remittitur of the 
Supreme Court in the present case, once it was filed, acted 
directly upon the judgment of the trial court, reversing it 
in toto. From and after December 8, 1961, the· date on which 
the remittitur in this case was filed with the Clerk of the 
Distric~t C'ourt, there was no judgment on the merits of the 
case for the trial court to amend or modify. The only 
10 
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authority vested in the trial court after that date was to 
enter a judgment for costs, in accordance with the direc-
tions of the remittitur. 
Judge Hoyt plainly erred when he entered the 
Amended Judgment and Decree granting affirmative relief 
to Plaintiffs. Such action subverted the effect of the 
Supreme Court's previous reversal, and constitutes an at-
tempt at usurpation of appellate power by the trial court. 
POINT 2. THE TRIAL COURT BELOW 
ERRED IN ENTERING THE AMENDED 
JUDGMENT IN THAT SUCH AMENDED 
JUDGMENT WAS NOT IN CONFORMITY 
WITH AND WAS CONTRARY TO THE RE-
MITTITUR AND THE OPINION OF THE. 
SUPREME COURT ENTERED IN THE CASE 
ON THE INITIAL APPEAL. 
As we have shown in the argument under Point 1, the 
trial court should not have entered any Amended J udg-
ment and Decree on the merits of the case. However, the 
Supreme Court in the Phebus case, supra, seems: to indicate 
that, while appellate judgments of unqualified reversal are 
self-executing orders upon which no further trial court ac-
tion should be based, entry of judgment upon the remittitur 
may constitute, at most, harmless error if the subsequent 
lower court judgment is in confornlity with the appellate 
decision. Thus, in Phebus, the Court said: 
''Assuming it were proper for that court [the District 
Court] to act, it should have set its entire decision 
aside for the reasons indicated above, and not limited 
its order to a. part only of its former decision. 
11 
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''Merely for the sake of clearing the record, the 
lower court should enter an order setting its entire de-
0ision aside without limitation.'' 
The form of Conclusions of Law and Judgment pro-
posed by Defendant (R. 9-a to 11-a) would have been con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's opinion and remittitur, 
and should have heen entered if a further order respecting 
the merits of the case was to be made. 
The Amended Conclusions of Law and Amended J udg-
ment and Decree entered by Judge Hoyt granted substan-
tial affirmative relief to the Plaintiffs. This was wholly in-
consistent with and opposed to the judgment on appeal and 
the remittitur. The resulting final order is erroneous and 
highly prejudicial to the Defendant, the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given, the Amended Judgment and 
Decree entered by Judge Hoyt on February 5, 1962, should 
be reversed and set aside, except for paragraph 6 thereof 
where judgment for costs is granted. Defendant prays that 
this court will direct the trial court to vacate and set aside 
its Amended Judgment and Decree except to the extent 
that the same grants judgment to Defendant in the sum of 
One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighteen Dollars and 
Thirty-Nine Cents ($1,718.39), or, in the alternative, that 
the Supreme Court enter the appropriate final judgment in 
the case and incorporate the same in its remittitur. 
12 
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Of Counsel: 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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Dated: April '2/J, 1962 
13 
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APPENDIX 
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